The actual construction work on the TAV has never begun. And upgrading the existing line would be enough. An interview with engineer Alberto Poggio.
For over thirty years, debate has raged over the construction of the high-speed rail line between Turin and Lyon, the TAV. The first discussions date back to the 1990s, when the Italian and French governments agreed for the first time to study a new link between the two countries across the western Alpine arc. The project received recognition at European level in 1994, having been included by the European Union in the list of corridors (14, later reduced to 9) of the trans-European transport network (TEN-T): the Turin-Lyon line thus became part of the "Mediterranean Corridor" Algeciras–Lviv (formerly Corridor 5 Lisbon–Kyiv). Formal collaboration between Italy and France began in 1996, and the first agreement was signed in 2001.
But since then, actual construction work on the line has never begun. Cases of corruption, design delays, changes of government, protests from local communities: the three decades that have passed have been punctuated by numerous obstacles to the project's realisation. Now that we have reached 2024, the question remains the same: where do things actually stand? LifeGate put that question to Alberto Poggio, an engineer and member of the Turin-Lyon technical commission of the Unione Montana Valle Susa.
Engineer Poggio, where do things stand with the Turin-Lyon high-speed line? We are talking about a total project length of 270 kilometres, of which 70 per cent lies in France and 30 per cent in Italy. The cross-border base tunnel accounts for just 57.5 kilometres of that. Its construction has been entrusted to an Italian-French public company called Telt. Then there are the two national sections: the Italian one, running from Turin to Bussoleno — the responsibility of Ferrovie dello Stato — and the French one — the responsibility of Sncf — from Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne to Lyon. Despite belonging to the same infrastructure, the three projects are being developed separately and are not coordinated with one another.
Let's start with the cross-border section. Recently, in December 2023, Transport and Infrastructure Minister Matteo Salvini visited Chiomonte, Turin, where he announced the launch of construction work on the Turin-Lyon base tunnel. Is that really so? In December, Minister Salvini only inaugurated the construction of a motorway junction. Despite the announcements, excavation of the base tunnel has never actually started here. The construction site at La Maddalena di Chiomonte has been open since 2011. The tunnel had to wait for work on an exploratory adit to study the geological characteristics of the mountain rock.
In the meantime, the project has accumulated delays due to the numerous design changes sought by those promoting the work. One of these chose to relocate the main excavation site for the Italian section of the tunnel (12.5 km) to the small site at Chiomonte. Not having been designed for this purpose, the cramped spaces currently available are inadequate to handle the enormous volumes of excavated spoil envisaged, which must therefore be transported elsewhere. This requires hundreds of thousands of lorry journeys — impossible to route along the only narrow mountain road leading to La Maddalena.
A serious problem, solvable only at the cost of building a further ancillary structure: a temporary junction on the A32 Fréjus motorway, whose viaduct passes 30 metres above the construction site. To reach it, a kind of reinforced-concrete "rollercoaster" is needed, with two steep ramps. This additional construction will take over two and a half years, with heavy traffic restrictions on the A32 motorway serving the tourist resorts of the upper Valle di Susa. The tunnel will have to wait even longer.
How is work progressing on the 45 kilometres of base tunnel in French territory? In 2001, work began in France on ancillary structures: three transverse galleries for service facility and vehicle access to the base tunnel, at Modane, La Praz and Saint-Martin-La-Porte. And then, also at Saint-Martin-La-Porte, another exploratory adit of around 10 km along the proposed route of the base tunnel. Having been partly funded by the European Union as a geognostic test, the adit cannot be declared as excavation of the tunnel. Finally, at the Avrieux site, a very lengthy drilling operation for some ventilation shafts is still ongoing.
The base tunnel is a twin-bore tunnel, meaning 115 km of galleries must be excavated. Excavation is carried out mainly using an automated boring machine known as a "mole". Seven such machines are planned, but to date not a single one is anywhere to be seen.
To demonstrate that work is not at a standstill, a construction site was opened in December 2022 at Saint-Julien-Montdenis, where the portal of the base tunnel is planned. After a year and a half of work using conventional equipment, barely 1 km has been excavated. A purely propagandistic operation to mask the reality of the situation: in France as in Italy, the works are in deep water.
What is more, just a few days ago, at the Saint-Julien-Montdenis site itself, a further fatal accident tragically occurred. For the Turin-Lyon project, this is the third workplace fatality in a year.
So much for the base tunnel. What can we say, then, about the two national sections, in Italy and France? In the mid-2000s, the Italian access section to the base tunnel had been envisaged running from Bussoleno to Settimo Torinese. After many route changes, in 2011 Ferrovie dello Stato proposed a preliminary design, which was then set aside by the government due to its exorbitant cost. In 2021 the proposal was revived in a scaled-down form: the government decided to use the existing lines, deemed adequate. The sole exception is the stretch between Avigliana and Turin, where there are continuing proposals to build a new line with a tunnel through the Collina Morenica di Rivoli. Despite the appointment of a new special commissioner (the third in twenty years), the planning situation remains murky. A further round of core drilling has recently been carried out in the territory of Rivalta. Evidently, ground surveys are still ongoing.
On the French side, discussion dragged on for twenty years. In 2019, the French government reached a definitive decision: it will upgrade the existing lines from Modane to Dijon for use as the access section to the base tunnel. Any potential construction of new lines will only be assessed after 2043, should a genuine increase in transport demand be recorded.
Putting the pieces of the puzzle back together, the picture is paradoxical. Definitive construction work on the base tunnel has not yet actually begun. Forecasts for its completion keep slipping, and are now pushing past the middle of the next decade. Assuming it is actually built, the base tunnel will find itself in the middle of already existing lines — not new ones, as people would have us believe: certainly in France, as decided by the government, and largely in Italy too, where planning for new routes is shrouded in uncertainty. The result? With or without the base tunnel, the transport capacity of the Turin-Lyon rail axis will remain the same as it is today. Indeed, a capacity that the French government considers adequate for the maximum freight flows observed over the past forty years.
Let us turn to the financial question. Who has to pay for the works? Public money. The national sections in Italy and France fall almost entirely on their respective state budgets. For the base tunnel, the apportionment established in the international agreements sees Italy shouldering 58 per cent of the cost against France's 42 per cent. A decidedly asymmetric split, given that the infrastructure runs for barely one fifth of its length through Italian territory and fully four fifths through French territory.
Both countries hope to cover more than 50 per cent of the base tunnel costs with European contributions. Over the past twenty years, funding has been requested from the European Union on multiple occasions; to date, the EU has disbursed contributions for preliminary studies and works. On 30 January last, yet another application was submitted under the latest available call of the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) programme dedicated to TEN-T projects. The outcome will only be known in the coming months. What is already known, however, is the call's budget of €2.7 billion, which the Turin–Lyon project will inevitably have to share with a host of other rail, road, air, port and river infrastructure projects put forward by member states along the 9 European corridors. The next funding opportunity will not come before 2028, after the approval of the European budget for the next seven-year period.
In short, very little money. The financial capacity of European contributions is wholly insufficient to keep the promises made regarding the completion of the base tunnel works. The 5 tunnel boring machines recently purchased by Telt are still sitting idle at assembly plants in Germany. Without the funds to set them running, they will remain parked there for a long time to come.
But how much money are we talking about in total, to see the project completed? The Turin–Lyon is the most expensive infrastructure project in Europe: €9.6 billion for the definitive works on the base tunnel. This figure is based on pre-pandemic cost estimates and predates the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and must therefore be revised upwards in light of recent rises in materials costs. In an earlier historical context, the construction of the Gotthard rail tunnel saw an increase of more than 15 per cent in total construction costs — in Switzerland, where standards of oversight are notoriously very high. In the Turin–Lyon shopping list, however, we must also count everything paid from 2001 to the present day for studies, geognostic surveys, preliminary works, design variants, communication campaigns, publications, conferences, consultancies, new offices, and so on. More than €2 billion already spent without a single metre of new railway having been laid. When we add it all up, we arrive at €12–13 billion. And so far we have only been talking about the cross-border tunnel.
For the two national sections, in the absence of detailed designs there are no reliable estimates of the construction costs of the new lines envisaged. In Italy, in 2011 the old design (subsequently shelved) was estimated at €4.6 billion, of which €1.7 billion was for the Avigliana–Turin section alone and approximately €0.2 billion for the upgrading of the Bussoleno–Avigliana stretch. In France, early estimates for new lines between Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne and Lyon exceeded €11 billion. In a later estimate, reduced in scope in an attempt to contain costs, the approximately 60 km of tunnels were planned entirely as single track. Even so, the figure still came to €7 billion — an expenditure the French government cannot afford. Not coincidentally, it has already opted for the upgrading of existing lines, at a cost of €0.7 billion (one tenth of that!).
I recall an estimate by the French Court of Auditors that put the total cost of the project at around €27 billion. Is that figure still current? In 2012 the French Court of Auditors raised the alarm over the Turin–Lyon, whose costs were ballooning to €26.1 billion. Since then the watchword has been "low cost". More than ten years on, we can try to repeat the same calculation. Adding together the unrevised estimates for the base tunnel and for the new lines on the Italian and French national sections in their reduced versions, we already exceed €20 billion. If we factor in the sharp rises in materials costs recorded in recent years, we are not far off the French Court of Auditors' estimate. The "low cost" project costs as much as the original one.
To sum up: the construction process has not yet truly begun, and in Italy we have neither a design nor funding. But at this point, could high-speed rail not simply modernise and use the lines that already exist, as the French have decided to do? The answer is yes. The railway line already exists and is operational, from the Val di Susa all the way to Turin. It is fully electrified and double-tracked. Ferrovie dello Stato has been increasing its transport capacity for years, both in terms of the number and the size of trains that can run on it. More than ten years ago, the enlargement of the existing tunnel between Bardonecchia and Modane was completed; its gauge is now suitable for the largest containers used in international trade ("high cube"). The characteristics of the existing line in Italy are adequate to the transport capacity that will be present in future on the French side.
So what, then, would be the purpose of the Turin–Lyon? A fair question, to which the simplistic communication campaigns of its proponents habitually respond with a slogan: "to get lorries off the roads." A perfectly laudable objective — indeed, one that could be pursued immediately by using the existing line, without waiting for the unreliable (as well as unnecessary) construction of a new Turin–Lyon line.
But if we take this advertisement at face value, the data on heavy vehicles speak for themselves. Every day, far more lorries travel along the Turin ring road than pass through the Mont Blanc and Fréjus tunnels combined. If we add private cars as well, traffic multiplies tenfold, owing to the shortcomings of local public transport.
Indeed, Turin holds the Italian record for air pollution — a rather dubious distinction earned through decades of underinvestment in sustainable mobility to serve people's daily travel needs. In order to cut half an hour off the journey to Paris (perhaps once a year, for those who can afford it), the everyday needs of citizens have been forgotten. Turin lacks the funds to build its second metro line: those are the funds being squandered on the Turin–Lyon.
TAV Turin-Lyon: behind the delays and proclamations, where things really stand
Mobility — di Maurizio Bongioanni
The actual construction work on the TAV has never begun. And upgrading the existing line would be enough. An interview with engineer Alberto Poggio.