Europe moves towards rearmament. At the expense of development aid and climate funding
Rights — di Simone Santi
The European Union moves towards rearmament. At the expense of development aid and climate funding, which are the real emergencies.

The European Union moves towards rearmament. At the expense of development aid and climate funding, which are the real emergencies.
So, are we really rearming? For days, weeks now, there has been talk of the elusive 800-billion-euro rearmament plan of the European Union; some have even reported that it has already been voted on and approved. The idea of a common European defence has also been pushed. And there is debate over whether to continue providing military aid to Ukraine against Russia's aggression. These three issues are obviously linked in some way by the common thread of weapons, yet they are quite distinct. And one of these issues also contains a piece of fake news.
Let us start with the fake news, which concerns the European rearmament plan. The Commission's idea would involve a total, gradual expenditure of 800 billion euros, borne by the individual member states: the ReArm plan would be incentivised by the fact that military arms spending could be ring-fenced and would not weigh on the constraints set by the Stability Pact, which obliges governments to remain within a precise ratio of debt to GDP.
According to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, the purpose of the plan "is to unlock the use of public financing in defence at the national level. Member states are ready to invest more in their own security if they have the fiscal space. And we need to enable them to do so. For example: if member states were to increase their defence spending by 1.5 per cent of GDP on average, this could create fiscal space of around 650 billion euros over a four-year period." The second lever would instead be "a new instrument that will provide 150 billion euros in loans to member states for defence investment." Total: 800 billion, as stated. So far, all true.
What is not true, however — despite many newspapers having written it and many politicians having said it — is that the European Parliament already gave the green light to rearmament with a vote on 12 March; and it probably never will, even if this does not mean that rearmament will not happen. On 12 March, the European Parliament, with a resolution approved by 419 votes in favour, 204 against and 46 abstentions, "simply" called on the European Union "to act with urgency and ensure its own security, including by taking actions close to those of a wartime footing." A mere opinion, with no force of law. Certainly: the resolution, which primarily concerns the implementation of a common defence at European level, also welcomes the rearmament plan recently presented by the Commission — which, however, was not part of the resolution and has therefore not yet been voted on. The point is that the new instrument von der Leyen refers to is provided for by Article 122, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU, which states:
Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional occurrences beyond its control, the Council, on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Union financial assistance to the Member State concerned.
Reading between the lines of this passage, all of this can happen by bypassing Parliament, which will thus be unable to have its say on these 150 billion euros in financing — a fact that has been criticised by, for example, several Italian MEPs belonging to the Socialists and Democrats group, who had intended to vote against ReArmEu, such as Cecilia Strada, who saw no particular urgency justifying this workaround.
The rationale behind this proposal is clear: on one hand, the persistent threat from Russia on the eastern front, which frightens countries neighbouring Ukraine and therefore the European Union itself. On the other, the risk of a significant disengagement by Donald Trump's United States, both on the Russia-Ukraine front and in funding for NATO. Equally clear, however, are the objections of those opposed to the rearmament plan: first and foremost, rearmament entrusted to individual states is very different from a common defence project, which would in fact also produce a rationalisation of investments — partly as a matter of negotiating power vis-à-vis the defence industries — and therefore, if anything, a reduction in spending. Military aid to Ukraine against Russia is also a separate matter, only partly linked to rearmament. Finally, the fear of Russia sits uneasily with the narrative put forward until just a few months ago: that of a Russian army now at breaking point and a country weakened by the economic sanctions imposed by the EU. Was that narrative wrong before, or is the current one mistaken?
Above all, Europe's rush towards a war economy will inevitably divert resources from other crucial sectors: in Italy the debate centres mainly on welfare and healthcare (there is a shortage of at least 40,000 doctors and nurses, and spending on the national health service is declining), but at a global level another increasingly urgent crisis will be pushed into the background: climate change. And its dramatic social consequences.
For example, what would become of the 300 billion dollars a year in climate aid to the world's poorest nations, promised by wealthy countries at the end of Cop29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, just a few months ago? "It will now be much harder to meet those commitments," Gareth Redmond-King, head of international programmes at the Energy and Climate Intelligence Unit, a British non-profit organisation, told Bloomberg Green. And the diversion of billions of euros away from development financing — funds intended to counter the devastating effects of floods, droughts and cyclones in the world's poorest countries — risks fuelling inflation, increasing migration flows and weakening the European Union's geopolitical standing.
The simplest and most effective solution for finding these funds would, in the end, always be the same: a tax on profits and windfall profits — for instance those of energy companies — or a small wealth tax on the highest incomes. But the first available data suggest that intentions lie elsewhere: in the United Kingdom (which is not part of the EU but, together with France, is taking the most hawkish stance in geographical Europe), Prime Minister Keir Starmer has announced £6 billion (approximately $7.6 billion) in cuts to international aid in order to fund an increase in military spending. In Germany, the government plans to reduce development funds by nearly one billion dollars, while in the Netherlands the cut will amount to €2.4 billion (approximately $2.5 billion). Similar measures are also being implemented in Finland, Sweden and Switzerland. Redmond-King stressed that this strategically shortsighted retreat will inevitably have direct consequences for a wide range of raw materials exported from producing countries to Europe: reduced protection against climate disasters could drive up the prices of products such as coffee, cocoa and bananas. Moreover, the current cuts to climate financing could lead to far higher costs in the near future. Paradoxically, the withdrawal of Western governments from development financing risks ceding influence in strategically relevant regions to countries considered hostile by Europe, such as Russia. "By cutting climate aid to developing countries, we risk removing a stabilising factor, leaving room for other actors — such as Russia — to fill the void."
In Italy the debate is currently very broad and runs along several tracks. There is the political one, which finds the government rather divided between those in favour of rearmament (Forza Italia and Fratelli d'Italia, with reservations about the type of investment, which they would prefer to be private rather than public) and those strongly opposed (Lega). The opposition is also fairly confused, to the point that the Rome demonstration on 15 March drew participation from both "hawks" and "doves," amid many distinctions and a single true common denominator: a generic call for a more united and stronger Europe. The idea of a common European defence — championed as far back as the Ventotene Manifesto of 1941 — appears to be the middle-ground solution most favoured by the opposition: this may also be the source of the tirade against the Manifesto written by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi during their confinement on the Pontic island, delivered by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni in the Chamber of Deputies.
On the question of how to find the funds to potentially increase spending by 1.5 per cent of GDP, a proposal has come from Minister of Enterprises and Made in Italy Adolfo Urso: converting the automotive industry — which has been in crisis for years — into a defence industry. "Our objective is to safeguard businesses and protect workers," Urso said. "That is why we are incentivising companies in the supply chain to diversify and repurpose their activities towards high-growth-potential sectors such as defence, aerospace, the blue economy and cybersecurity." The idea was already rejected during a parliamentary hearing by the president and CEO of Stellantis — the group that includes Fiat — John Elkann: "We do not believe that the future of the car industry is the defence industry; the future of the car industry is tied to Europe deciding, in terms of industrial policy, where it is important to allocate resources." But above all, the idea of converting the automotive sector had already featured in the Green New Deal of the previous European legislative term, which envisaged a transition to sustainable production (electric vehicles, renewable energy generation): merely contemplating the opposite is, evidently, a step backwards.