The image of the lifeless body of former Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro, crumpled in the boot of a Renault 4 found in Via Caetani, in Rome, changed the history of our country. That photograph, on 9 May 1978, went around the world. Even today, it stands as the symbol of the "years of lead": the apex of a creeping civil war that scarred Italy throughout the seventies and eighties. Made up of hundreds of attacks, massacres and deaths. Of an uncontrolled, magmatic universe of political movements that fatally overstepped the extreme boundaries of their theoretical frameworks. Of roles played by certain state apparatus that have never been fully clarified.

The kidnapping in Via Mario Fani, on 16 March 1978

The end of the twice-serving head of the Italian government officially began on 16 March 1978. Aldo Moro — a lecturer in Criminal Law, a former member of the Constituent Assembly in 1946 and a member of parliament since 1948 — left his apartment as he did every morning and got into the car with his escort. He reached Via Mario Fani, a quiet street in a residential district of the capital. There the convoy came to a halt: a commando of five men drew up alongside the cars and opened fire. Five servicemen — two carabinieri and three police officers — were killed.

Moro, the sole survivor of the massacre, was kidnapped. A few hours later, with simultaneous claims issued in Rome, Milan and Turin, the Red Brigades announced the unthinkable: the terrorist group had kidnapped the president of the Christian Democracy party. Moro was in the hands of the BR.

Aldo Moro's outstretched hand to the Italian Communist Party

It was no ordinary day, that Thursday 16 March. At 10 o'clock in the morning, a confidence vote was scheduled for the formation of the fourth government chaired by Giulio Andreotti: for the first time in the history of republican Italy, the executive was to be supported by a majority extended to include the Italian Communist Party. Enrico Berlinguer's PCI, after decades of opposition, was preparing for a turning point: it was the fulfilment of the "historic compromise", the birth of a "national unity" government, the mainstreaming of the communists. An alliance between the PCI and the DC whose orchestration had been conducted — patiently, over years — by Aldo Moro himself. Who that morning was on his way to Parliament for the vote.

Two days after the kidnapping, on Saturday 18 March, the Red Brigades announced their "communiqué number one" from a telephone box in the centre of Rome. "Aldo Moro," the text read, "is being held in a people's prison and will be tried by a people's tribunal." A drama began that lasted 55 days, punctuated by silences and BR communiqués and marked by the agonising internal debate within the DC: whether to accept or refuse negotiations with the terrorists.

The 55 days of captivity, the refusal to negotiate and the order of execution

During the days of his captivity, Aldo Moro wrote many letters: to the government, to his family. Even to the Pope. He pleaded with the state to open dialogue with the brigadists, even at the cost of accepting their demands (for his release they demanded the freeing of several imprisoned terrorists). On 19 April he wrote to DC secretary Benigno Zaccagnini, foreshadowing the worst: "My blood would fall upon you, upon the party, upon the country…".

Within the government and the DC, the hard line prevailed. The party, led by Andreotti and Interior Minister Francesco Cossiga, rejected any compromise with the BR. Some decades later, widow Eleonora would accuse: "Those who were in the various positions of command in the government wanted him eliminated". The terrorists' final communiqué, number nine, arrived on 5 May. It announced the conclusion of the people's trial against the statesman: "We conclude the battle begun on 16 March, by carrying out the sentence." Aldo Moro wrote to his wife: "Now, suddenly, when some faint hope was beginning to take shape, the order of execution arrives, incomprehensibly." Four days later his body would be found in Via Caetani. A street chosen with care: situated at an equal distance from the headquarters of the PCI and the DC.

The convictions of the brigadists and the confessions of the American official

Dozens of brigadists were convicted for the murder of Aldo Moro, including Mario Moretti, one of the founders of the BR and at the time the head of the organisation. The judges handed down 32 life sentences and 316 years of imprisonment. Beyond the convictions, however, a great many theories have been put forward surrounding the Moro kidnapping. Some have held that the Red Brigades had been infiltrated by the American secret services, with the aim of discrediting the communist cause in a country where the PCI was by then winning the support of a third of the electorate.

Ten years ago, in 2008, the theories of United States involvement were lent weight by the confessions of a former Washington official, Steve Pieczenik, who worked under secretaries of state Henry Kissinger, Cyrus Vance and James Baker. The man told the American press that he had taken part in the sabotage of negotiations with the BR, stating that the idea had been to "sacrifice Aldo Moro for the maintenance of political stability in Italy".

Francesco Cossiga on French television in 2008: "Hard line, even at the cost of sacrificing Moro"

In a book published by Pieczenik himself (entitled "Abbiamo ucciso Aldo Moro"), the former official states that he was sent by then president Jimmy Carter to serve on a "crisis committee" headed by Minister Cossiga. According to Pieczenik, the fear was linked to the possibility that Moro might reveal certain state secrets to the terrorists.

And so, a fake communiqué was fabricated, attributed to the Red Brigades, which stated that Moro had already been killed. This served the dual purpose of preparing public opinion for the worst and of making clear to the terrorists that the state would never negotiate: as far as the government was concerned, Moro was already dead.

In 2008, the French television channel France 5 broadcast a documentary made by journalist Emmanuel Amara. The film also features Cossiga, sitting on a sofa in front of a television showing Pieczenik as he reveals his version of events. Events that Cossiga confirms: "A negotiation had to be avoided at all costs. Even if the price to be paid was the sacrifice of Moro."

The works inspired by the Moro case

This and other theories surrounding the death of Aldo Moro (which, beyond the court documents, still leaves — objectively — numerous and troubling unanswered questions) have been the subject of countless essays, newspaper articles, films and theatrical works. Such is the case with "Todo modo", a 1976 film by Elio Petri (adapted from the novel of the same name by Leonardo Sciascia) in which a character inspired by the former president of the DC was played by Gian Maria Volonté. Or "Il caso Moro", by Giuseppe Ferrara (1986). Or again "Romanzo di una strage", by Marco Tullio Giordana (2012).

As well as two films by Marco Bellocchio: "Buongiorno, notte" (2003) and "Esterno notte", a 330-minute feature presented in two parts in cinemas between the months of May and June last year, which was later adapted into a TV mini-series for Raiuno. Playing Aldo Moro in this case is Fabrizio Gifuni.

Also rich in revelations and analysis is the documentary "Com'è nato un golpe: il caso Moro", directed by Tommaso Cavallini and written by Paola Baiocchi and Andrea Montella. From it emerges an even more tangled and unsettling picture of one of the darkest chapters in the history of our Republic.

The Moro case has been brought to the stage, among others, by Corrado Augias and Vladimiro Polchi, with "Aldo Moro – Una tragedia italiana" (2007, directed by Giorgio Ferrara). And again by Marco Baliano with "Corpo di stato – Il delitto Moro: una generazione divisa" (1998, directed by Maria Maglietta).